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 1 
Explaining Failure: the Highs and Lows of Sardinian Nationalism 
Eve Hepburn 
 
Abstract 
Most analyses of nationalist and regionalist parties focus on cases of ‘success’ – with the 
usual suspects of the Scottish National Party, Parti Québécois and Convergència i Unió 
dominating the field. Yet, by exploring the performance of only a select group of most-similar 
cases, it is difficult to distinguish what the conditions for success – and failure – in regional 
mobilisation are. This contribution focuses on the rise and fall of the Sardinian Party of 
Action (Partito Sardo d’Azione), the oldest nationalist party in Italy. It explores the decisions 
that the party has made in response to multidimensional competition in a multilevel polity, 
and identifies which factors have led to its continuing electoral and political weakness. These 
include the party’s ideological incoherence, its failure to compete successfully with nationalist 
competitors and regional branches of statewide parties, the bipolarisation of the party system, 
its erratic choices of coalition partners, and its limited adaptation to multi-level politics. 
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Introduction 
Sardinia has been largely overlooked by scholars of nationalism and regionalism. This is 
primarily because the island’s territorial politics have been overshadowed by the success of 
their Northern Italian counterparts. Unlike the Lega Nord (Northern League), Sardinia’s 
stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) have failed to pose a major threat to the 
territorial integrity of the Italian state or to catalyse constitutional reforms in Italy. But 
Sardinia is an interesting case for several reasons. The Partito Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian 
Action Party) is the oldest SNRP in Italy, and was the first to demand autonomy and 
recognition of its nationhood within the modern Italian state. Catapulted onto the Sardinian 
political scene with 36% of the vote in 1921, the Psd’Az has since remained the largest SNRP 
in Sardinia. However, its electoral fortunes have declined steadily throughout the postwar 
period, to the point that the Psd’Az rarely achieved more than 5% of the vote in the 2000s. 
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 Why was the Psd’Az never able to recover its electoral fortunes? This is a pertinent 
question not only for the Partito Sardo, but for all ‘declining’ regionalist parties. It is just as 
imperative to explain failure as success when seeking to understand contemporary regionalist 
mobilisation. A great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the usual suspects of the 
Scottish National Party, Parti Québécois, Convergència i Unió and the Lega Nord (i.e. 
Keating, 1996; Cento Bull, 1997; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005). But few academic 
researchers have focussed on negative cases, where nationalist and regionalist parties have not 
succeeded in becoming electorally significant on a permanent basis. This is an important 
shortcoming in the literature. As Rydgren (2002) argues, ‘in comparative analysis negative 
cases are as important as positive cases’. Cases of failure provide us with important 
information about the factors that explain variation in regional mobilisation. Importantly, a 
case of failure is more than the absence of its success. A number of scholars have identified 
‘conditions for success’ in regionalist mobilisation. Most notably, Müller-Rommel (1998) 
identified two theoretical explanations for the electoral success of regionalist parties – 
competitive models and rational choice models. In the former, electoral systems with 
proportional representation and decentralised systems foster the success of regionalist parties, 
as does the existence of a strong leader, a strong party organisation and an electorate alienated 
from mainstream politics (Hauss and Rayside, 1978). Rational choice models, alternatively, 
emphasise that regionalist parties succeed when they compete on (territorial) issues that 
mainstream parties fail to account for (Levi and Hecther, 1985). However, these factors 
explaining the ‘success’ of regionalist parties often fail to account for their failure. In 
particular, scholars have much to learn about the strategic choices that nationalist and 
regionalist parties must make regarding their policy platforms, coalition partners, and their 
priorities in pursuing vote-, office- or policy-seeking strategies (Strøm, 1990) in order to 
survive in contemporary party systems. These issues are especially pertinent in the light of 
new challenges facing SNRPs. What is the most successful response to multi-level, 
multidimensional politics, and what response spells failure?  
In this contribution, the main proposition put forward to account for the decline of the 
Psd’Az has to do with the party’s unwillingness, or inability, to categorise itself on the left-
right ideological dimension. This hypothesis accords with Michael Freeden’s (1998) 
argument that nationalism constitutes a ‘thin’ ideology that must be supplemented with a 
broad socioeconomic programme in order for a party to achieve electoral success. The Psd’Az 
has sought to appeal to the broadest strata of the Sardinian electorate united under a banner of 
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self-government, by de-emphasising class or socioeconomic policy issues. However, the 
party’s ideological flexibility has been a hindrance as well as advantage. 
The discussion begins with an overview of the development of the Psd’Az, 
highlighting a number of difficulties relating to its refusal, or inability, to categorise itself 
ideologically. However, ideological incoherence is not the only explanation for the decline of 
the Psd’Az. In a multidimensional, multi-level policy space, there have been other challenges 
facing the Psd’Az. The second part of the article explores the effects of the reform of the 
Italian political system in the 1990s on the Psd’Az, at which point the party’s electoral 
fortunes dropped sharply. These factors include the rise of nationalist and regionalist 
competitors, the territorialisation of statewide parties, the reform of the electoral system 
(resulting in more bipolar politics), and the challenge of multi-level politics. Each of these 
factors in turn helps to explain why the Psd’Az has ultimately failed to achieve its aims. The 
identification of factors accounting for ‘failure’ in this case of regionalist mobilisation opens 
up important new agendas for further comparative research.  
  
The Rise and Fall of a Nationalist Movement 
The Partito Sardo d’Azione (Psd’Az) was formed by ex-combatants from the famous ‘Brigati 
Sassari’ (Sassari Brigades) – a Sardinian section of the Italian armed forces that fought 
together in Germany during the First World War. Headed by the charismatic ex-soldier, 
Emilio Lussu, the Psd’Az benefited from a surge of mass popular nationalism in Sardinia 
during this period, winning the support of a large stratum of the population, especially former 
soldiers, peasants and miners. The war had provided the first large collective experience of 
the Sardinian people as a whole, which had been geographically isolated in pockets of 
communities spread across the island. Their participation in the war ensured that ‘for the first 
time ever [the Sards] engaged in contact with the reality of the national vision’ (Melis, 1982: 
23). In return for the sacrifices of the ‘intrepid Sardinians’ during the war, the Psd’Az 
demanded a form of political and administrative self-determination in order to protect the 
Sardinian identity, language and culture. The first party congress was held on 16 April 1921 
in Oristano, making the Psd’Az ‘the first and most important autonomist movement’ as well 
as one of the oldest surviving parties of any kind in Italy (Vallauri, 1994: 199).1 In the 
elections that year, the party won 36% of the popular vote, establishing itself as a mass 
movement for the autonomy of Sardinia. In the following year, the party developed a more 
specific political orientation as a republican-federalist party during its second Congress. ‘First 
Sards, then Italians’ was the message of the first Sardista demonstration in Cagliari organised 
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by the Psd’Az (Cubeddu, 1995: 270). The party did not want independence, but rather a clear 
federal Italian pact. It also made references to the creation of a Federazione mediterranea, a 
theme that would occur in later party programmes (Mattone, 1982: 74; Cubeddu, 1995: 270).  
 
Ideological polarisation of the Psd’Az 
However, the PSd’Az’s ideological position was less clear. Attempts to pull the party in the 
direction of socialism in order to represent the struggle of the workers in an autonomous 
Sardinia were met with opposition. And when the Italian Fascist Party began making headway 
in Sardinia in 1923, most of the party’s leaders, under the direction of Paolo Pilli, decided to 
break with Lussu’s radical socialists (Addis Saba, 1982: 132). Thus, the party split into two 
groups, whereby one section entered an alliance with Mussolini’s Partito Italiano Fascista 
(which was then quite insignificant in Sardinia), whilst the other, led by Emilio Lussu, 
vigorously opposed the Fascists. The main reason why the conservative section of the Psd’Az 
decided to merge with the Fascists was due to Mussolini’s promise of ‘autonomy’ for the 
island in 1923. This bolstered hopes for recognition of Sardinia as a separate political and 
cultural entity. But for the negotiators of this deal, what ‘autonomy’ actually meant was the 
reward of a billion lire for Sardinia, to be spent on public works and land reclamation. Whilst 
the money did end up exchanging hands in 1924, the project of granting Sardinia special 
status was soon abandoned in the lead up to the Second World War and Mussolini’s imperial 
adventures in Ethiopia, when state centralisation was the key order of the day.  
The rump of the Partito Sardo d’Azione, under the direction of Lussu, re-emerged 
following the fall of Fascism in Italy in 1943 after years in exile. By this time, the autonomist 
movement had come to mean many different things for different groups, such as anti-fascism, 
the struggle of the peasants and miners, and an anti-war movement (Melis, 1982). However, it 
was unable to galvanise the pre-war levels of support, as the reputation of the party had been 
tarnished by its association with Fascism and it could not depend on the automatic assistance 
of the ex-servicemen’s associations. Despite this, the party was still considerably large and 
influential (with 40,000 members, making it the strongest mass party on the island), and set 
about developing a constitutional programme: ‘the Psd’Az is firmly convinced that only a 
restructuring of the state along republican-federal lines will save and reinforce national unity, 
guarantee and intensify the exercise of individual, communal and regional rights, and allow 
for the realisation of a substantive social justice’ (cited in Melis, 1982: 30).   
The Psd’Az suffered another severe set-back in 1948. Emilio Lussu, the party’s best-
known protagonist, decided that he was tired of accommodating the conservative-moderate 
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elements in the party, and established his own Partito Sardo d’Azione Socialista (Psdas) in 
order to revive the socialist sardism of the post-First World War era. During the elections that 
year, the Psd’Az obtained 10.5% of the vote with seven seats in the Assembly, and the 
Socialist Psd’Az took 6.6% and three seats. The split served to benefit neither party: ‘one lost 
its radical wing and found itself weakened in the face of moderate Christian democracy, the 
other, viewed with suspicion as a potential rival by the communist party, was never able to 
find its own niche’ (Addis Saba, 1982: 135). Lussu’s Psdas finally merged with the Partito 
Socialista Italiano in 1949, which thereafter became more favourably disposed towards 
greater regionalisation of Italy. Meanwhile, the Partito Sardo d’Azione – having lost its 
socialist strand – veered to the right and began a long collaboration with the Christian 
Democrats, which was to last until the 1980s when the party moved again to the Left. The 
party’s alliance with the DC meant that it entered a number of the regional governments of the 
1950s, 1960s and 1970s, giving it experience in power as well as the ability to push through 
with some of its projects. But the Psd’Az also suffered from this collaboration, due to the 
failure of the government’s economic development plans and its inability to break Sardinia’s 
dependence on the central state for favours and patronage. 
 
The failure to obtain ‘real’ autonomy for Sardinia 
In 1946-8, the Psd’Az put forward proposals for a Special Statute for Sardinia in the Italian 
Constitution. Sardinia’s qualification for special treatment was largely due to the strength of 
the autonomist movement, and the island’s historical claim to nationhood.2 The Psd’Az 
sought exclusive legislative competences across a wide range of areas including policing, 
work and pensions, health, finance, industry, agriculture and education (Mattone, 1982: 30). It 
failed, however, to obtain many of these powers. Months of internal bickering among 
Sardinian parties led the Italian government to take charge and draw up the Statuto, which 
was then approved by the Italian Parliament. In short, Sardinia was handed a watered-down 
constitution decreed by Rome that had no popular backing. Of note, within the statute, 
Sardinia received a special clause that did not appear in any of the other regional 
constitutions: a commitment by the Italian state to ‘the economic and social renaissance of the 
island’ (Art.13, Constitutional Act 1948). The insertion of this cause altered the very nature of 
Sardinian autonomy within Italy, which signified the ‘request for material concessions and 
modernisation’ (Clark, 1989), and sealed Sardinia’s future dependence on the state.  
On the first matter, the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno – Italy’s office for regional 
development in the South – had implemented several ‘Plans of Rebirth’ (Piani di Rinascità) 
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with the complicity of the Sardinian regional government to create high-technology industries 
such as petrochemicals, steelworks and oil refineries on the island from the 1960s. It could be 
argued that one of the aims of the Italian government’s southern development policy had been 
‘to ‘italianise” the obstinate Sards and their centuries-old local culture’ (Hospers and 
Benneworth, 2005: 343). Secondly, the widespread practice of ‘clientelismo e sottogoverno’ 
(Melis, 1982: 2) meant that ruling politicians siphoned off the regional funds to strengthen 
their own party bases. Thus, the autonomous institutions of Sardinia were run by the 
entrenched regional political class that were strongly linked to, and highly dependent on 
Rome. The imposition of an alien form of industrialisation without the involvement of local 
practitioners spelt disaster. As the industrial plants failed to provide many jobs and the 
traditional agro-pastoral economy was ignored, the Sardinian people turned against the 
‘cathedrals in the desert’. Popular resistance to the plans degenerated into criminal activities 
such as banditry and kidnapping in the pastoral and central mountain areas. The regional 
government’s inability to control the banditry or to set a realizable path of economic 
development tarnished the Partito Sardo’s reputation as a party committed to the protection 
of Sardinian territorial interests. Thereafter, it entered a period of crisis in the 1960s and 
1970s, unable to win more than 5% of the vote (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 - Psd'Az results in National, Regional and Provincial Elections 
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Source: Istituto Cattaneo, Archivi ‘Adele’ (www.cattaneo.org) 
 
Absorbing cultural nationalism – Psd’Az and neo-sardismo 
The precarious position of the Psd’Az was soon reversed as it began to take advantage of the 
burgeoning success of a new cultural nationalist movement, known as neo-sardismo. This 
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movement, which was based on the demand for the use of the Sard language in schools and 
the media, and the maintenance of Sardinian cultural traditions, soon gained considerable 
popular success in the late 1960s. The expression of Sardinian identity was one of the mantles 
taken up by the militant student movement, and was supported by intellectuals and cultural 
associations across the island. Indeed, a number of organisations were established during the 
early 1970s that sought to achieve these explicitly socio-cultural goals. The movement soon 
acquired political overtones, namely a demand for independence based on territorial and 
cultural grievances that were framed in the language of anti-colonialism and ‘third-worldism’. 
Its new political protagonists included Il Fronte Indipendentista Sardo, Sardinnya e Libertat, 
Democrazia Proletaria Sarda and Su Populu Sardo. The latter organisation, established in 
1973, was a militant student group that temporarily merged with the Psd’Az in 1981 (it would 
later split away again to form a competitor nationalist party in Sardinia, Sardignia Natzione). 
As a result of this, and the Psd’Az’s adoption of specifically cultural and linguistic goals, the 
party enjoyed a boom in electoral support, and in 1985 the Psd’Az received over 15% of the 
vote across the island, which increased to over 20% in Oristano and quarters of Cagliari.  
The involvement of the Psd’Az in the neo-sardism movement had other effects on its 
organisation and policy. The party adopted many of the neo-sardist movement’s goals, such 
as making the Sard language official in public institutions and taught in schools. Prior to this, 
the party had rarely mentioned language in its policies and goals (Clark, 1980: 452). Most 
significantly, the party officially changed its main goal from federalism to supporting 
independence in 1979-80 (Petrosino, 1988). This led many neo-sardisti to join the party, thus 
expanding and diversifying the party’s membership. In response to its new membership, the 
Psd’Az moved again to the left. However, the goal of independence was unclear. The party 
argued that its support for independence was ‘functional’ but did not detract from their goal of 
reforming the Italian state on the basis of a federal constitution. This ambivalence frustrated 
its new members, leading to internal divisions and the creation of a new political party with 
the explicit goal of creating an independent Sardinia along socialist lines (see below). The 
Psd’Az itself, having lost its militant wing, thereafter engaged in a governing coalition with 
the left (the Communists and Socialists) and others (PRI and PSDI) in 1984-89.  
 
A European lifeline? 
As its difficulties mounted in the Sardinian political arena, the Psd’Az began to look to 
Europe as a potential salve for its woes. Since its inception, the Psd’Az has consistently 
adopted a pro-European attitude, envisioning Sardinian self-determination within a wider 
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Europe of the Peoples. Furthermore, unlike some nationalist and regionalist movements in 
Italy, the Psd’Az prides itself in articulating a pro-European outward-looking ‘civic’ brand of 
nationalism (Melis, 1994), denouncing the Lega Nord as ‘Northern racists’. These Europhile 
aspects of its programme and rhetoric allowed the Psd’Az to position itself as the most pro-
European and Europe-savvy party in Sardinia. And with the introduction of direct elections to 
the European Parliament in 1979, this opened up a new and important channel for the Psd’Az 
to advance its territorial project. When it first competed in European elections in 1984, the 
Psd’Az managed to elect one of its representatives, Mario Melis, to the European Parliament 
(see Table 1). This was an impressive accomplishment given that Sardinia shares an electoral 
constituency for the European elections with Sicily, which is 4 times the size of Sardinia. But 
the party was able to strike a deal with the Sicilians, and put together an electoral list with 
Union Valdôtaine in the North of Italy. Melis was well-known to voters and won a great deal 
of popular support, as President of the Region of Sardinia in 1982 and 1984-89. Melis also 
played a significant role in pushing the issue of European political integration to the forefront 
of Sardinian politics, by envisaging a stronger role for the regions in determining European 
policy and its future direction. Melis was among the first to use the concept of a Europe of the 
Regions in his proposals in Brussels and he was also instrumental in drawing up the laws 
establishing the Committee of the Regions (Melis, 1994). This earned him a great deal of 
respect in Sardinia and Europe, and he was re-elected in the 1989-94 European Parliament. 
 
 
Table 1: European electoral performance of Psd’Az & coalition partners, 1979-2009 
 
Regionalist list Votes (no.) 
Vote Share 
(%) 
Seats 
1979 - - - - 
1984 Psd’Az & UV* 115,862 12.7 1 
1989 Psd’Az & UV 98,095 10.6 1 
1994 Psd’Az & UV 5, 872 0.66 - 
1999 Psd’Az & PdC** 20,209 2.6 - 
2004 Lega per l’aut.*** 13,112 1.46 - 
2009 - - - - 
Source: Istituto Cattaneo and Roux (2006) 
 
*UV – Union Valdôtaine 
**PdC – Partito dei Consumatori 
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***Lega per l’autonomia included Psd’Az, Alleanza Lombarda, Liga Fronte Veneto, Union für Südtirol, Lega Pensionati 
 
 
This 1980s were a crucial period for the Psd’Az in establishing itself as a European 
party. Its central goal of exercising autonomy in a federal Europe of the Peoples demonstrated 
to the Sardinian electorate that the Psd’Az would highlight the cause of Sardinian self-
determination in Europe, and protect its interests in Brussels. One author has argued that the 
Psd’Az was a ‘precursor’ of the idea of a Europe of the Peoples and the Ethnies (Vallauri, 
1994: 1999). This refers to the writings of the Sardinian nationalist intellectual Antonio 
Simon Mosso in the 1960s, who argued that Sardinia should be assured a place within a 
European federation that was based on the ‘ethnies’ of Europe (Contu, 1992: 30). The Psd’Az 
was also a founding member of the European Free Alliance (EFA), a ‘Europarty’ for 
nationalist and regionalist parties in Europe. This involvement in European institutions and 
networks cemented the Psd’Az’s alliance with a number of like-minded parties across Europe, 
in particular with nationalist and regionalist parties in Corsica, Catalonia and the Basque 
Country. 
 However, there have been some problems with the Psd’Az’s use of Europe to find 
solutions to its territorial demands. Firstly, during this period of direct Sardinian 
representation in Europe, all of the mainstream parties in Sardinia became pro-European. 
However, the difficulty here was that Europe also became unproblematic in Sardinian 
politics: party approaches to European integration were (and remain) reactive and uncritical, 
at least when policies do not affect Sardinian economic interests. This party consensus on 
Europe undermined the Psd’Az’s unique stance of seeking a Europe of the Peoples. Secondly, 
after the 1980s, Sardinia later experienced problems of representation in European 
institutions, with Sicily almost always electing one of its own candidates to the European 
Parliament. Sardinia has not had its own MEP since 1994. A large barrier to Sardinian 
political engagement with Europe is thus its lack of direct representation. This caused the 
Partito Sardo d’Azione and other nationalist and regionalist parties to boycott the European 
elections in 2009 and called on Sardinian voters to do the same (L’Unione Sarda, 15 May 
2009). Their campaign to dissuade Sards from voting had a strong effect: voter turnout, at 
40.9%, was the lowest in Italy and showed the highest decrease of any region (Cattaneo, 
2009) 
 Furthermore, whilst the Psd’Az was actually able to elect a representative to Europe in 
1989, its support in the regional election that year dropped to 10%, which started a period of a 
long electoral decline. Despite its efforts to trumpet its achievements in Europe, these were 
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overshadowed by the party’s discredited alliance with the statewide parties in regional 
government, and the failure of the government’s plans for industrialisation, in the Sardinian 
political arena. Furthermore, the party’s reluctance to press for independence, preferring 
instead autonomy in a federal Europe, ended up damaging its reputation: it was seen to have 
failed on its key commitment to securing a ‘real’ autonomy for the island.  
 
Joining the Olive Alliance 
The Psd’Az faced a further problem in the early 1990s: the move to a bipolar party system in 
Italy. The party’s response was to cement its alliance with parties of the centre-left in Italy, 
with which it had worked since the 1980s. The centre-left appeared to constitute the better 
protector of Sardinian interests as they were instrumental in pushing for state decentralisation 
to take the separatist rug from beneath the Lega Nord’s feet. The Left also appeared more 
sympathetic to protecting Sardinian cultural interests at the regional level.  
In 1994 the Partito Sardo elected four members to the Regional Council, who 
participated in the centre-left government and contributed to legislation on the Sardinian 
language, and laws on banditry. The Psd’Az later entered the L’Ulivo alliance in 1996, hoping 
to reinforce its socialist credentials and to influence the centre-left alliance from within to 
adopt a position more favourable to increased regional autonomy. This served the party well 
in the elections of 1996, as the pact signed between Romani Prodi and the Psd’Az resulted in 
the party’s president, Franco Meloni, being elected to the national senate. However, the 
party’s alliance with the Left also resulted in a major internal crisis. The party still contained a 
right-wing section, and collaboration with the Olive alliance resulted in the defection of one 
prominent member, Efisio Serrenti, and his followers. Due to this internal ideological crisis, 
the Psd’Az chose to stand outside the two main poles in the 1999 elections. The party divided 
into two camps: the ‘official’ party being led by Giacomo Sanna and Franco Meloni, who 
sought rapprochement with the Left, and the section headed by Serrenti entered a coalition 
with the centre-right, later founding a new nationalist right-wing party: Sardistas (which has 
since remained electorally insignificant) Efisio Serrenti was himself elected President of the 
Region with support of the two main right-wing Italian parties: Forza Italia and Alleanza 
Nazionale. Following the break-up, Sardistas continued to use the traditional sardista logos, 
slogans and symbols of the Psd’Az, which incited the fury Giacomo Sanno who claimed that 
Sardistas was not a ‘proper’ nationalist party (La Nuova Sardegna, 1 May 2001).3   
In the wake of this ideological turmoil, the Psd’Az congress voted against renewing its 
alliance with L’Ulivo in 2001. Party Secretary Giacomo Sanno also argued that Prodi’s 
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alliance ‘did not have any have any arguments in the interests of Sardinia’ and the Sardinian 
centre-left parties did not have ‘the minimum of autonomy from Rome’ (La Nuova Sardegna, 
1 May 2001). The Union’s rhetoric about strengthening Sardinian identity and autonomy was 
criticised as an empty gesture to ensure the support of the Psd’Az, whose partnership it 
needed to form a government. The Left’s reluctance to recognise regional claims may have 
been because at the state level, any endorsement of the right to self-determination could play 
into the hands of Bossi’s demand for independence. At this point, the Psd’Az decided to 
reinforce its nationalist credentials rather than its socialist credentials, and to seek to build an 
alliance with other newly-emerging nationalist and regionalist parties in Sardinia. 
 
Other factors accounting for Psd’Az decline 
So far, we have seen that ideological flexibility has constituted a double-edged sword for the 
Psd’Az. The Psd’Az has sought to appeal to the broadest strata of the Sardinian electorate 
united under a common banner of self-government. This has involved making electoral and 
government coalitions with parties of both the left and right. Although this strategy has given 
the Psd’Az experience in government, it has been inherently problematical, resulting in 
divisions, splits and a loss of popular support. However, ideological incoherence is not the 
only reason for explaining for the decline in the Psd’Az. There were other salient factors 
resulting from the changing Italian party system. First the Psd’Az faced competition from new 
nationalist and regionalist parties in Sardinia (which had split from the Psd’Az), and which 
adopted more radical autonomy goals. Second was the ‘territorialisation’ of statewide parties, 
whereby Sardinian branches sought greater autonomy from the Italian party organisations, 
and adopted stronger territorial goals to compete with the Psd’Az. This included the birth of a 
highly successful centre-left—nationalist movement called Progetto Sardegna. Third, the 
Psd’Az faced challenges resulting from electoral system change and the move to more bipolar 
politics in Italy, which squeezed out smaller parties. And finally, there were challenges of 
multi-level politics, whereby the Psd’Az was forced to develop integrated strategies on three 
fronts: Sardinia, Italy and Europe, which it failed to do.  Let us now explore each of these 
issues in greater detail to assess their impact on the Psd’Az’s electoral fortunes. 
 
The Challenge from the Nationalist Left 
As the Psd’Az moved back and forth on both its ideological and its constitutional objectives, 
it was challenged by two smaller nationalist and regionalist parties that had much firmer 
convictions on both these matters. Sardigna Nazione (SN) and Indipendentzia Reppubrica 
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Sardignia (IRS) emerged on the political scene advocating independence for Sardinia, framed 
in the language of anticolonialism. Both parties had their roots in the neo-sardism movement, 
which opposed the corruption of statewide party politics and called for the full ‘emancipation’ 
of Sardinia (as opposed to the creation of a federal Italy as the Psd’Az advocated). The oldest 
of these, Sardigna Nazione (SN) claims Su Populu Sardo as a direct predecessor. Following 
the Partito Sardo’s abandonment of the goal of independence in the early 1980s, the wing of 
the party comprised of former Su Populu Sardo members (a strongly leftist student-led 
organisation that had joined the Psd’Az in 1981) broke away to form their own party. The 
Partidu Sardu Indipendentista Sotzialiasta Libertariu (PSIN) was created in 1984 to pursue 
the goal of independence for Sardinia. As the name suggests, the party also had a specific 
ideological orientation: that of libertarian socialism. The PSIN was inspired by the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989, and the re-awakening of nationalism in the former USSR. The party was 
responsible for beginning a tradition of militant political nationalism on the island, organising 
demonstrations against the perceived oppression of Sards by Italian elites.  
 Sardigna Natzione (SN) was founded by former PSIN members in 1994. The SN 
maintained the rhetoric of the earlier cultural movement, and used the language of anti-
colonialism to wage its battle against the Italian state. However, the party was still forced to 
compete with the Psd’Az for nationalist support. In the regional elections of 1994, the SN 
won 3% of the vote. The SN sought to distinguish itself from the Psd’Az by supporting full 
independence for Sardinia. To reflect this objective more clearly, the party added the word 
‘independence’ to its name in 2002: it is now called Sardigna Natzione Indipendentzia. But 
another way of distinguishing itself from the Partito Sardo, according to the national 
coordinator of the party, Bustiano Cumpostu, was to transcend all ideology and reject any 
collaboration with Italian parties of the left or right, in order to pave the way for national self-
determination.4 Therefore, the SN, despite its clearly socialist roots, sought to become even 
more ideology-free than the Psd’Az, by renouncing any coalitions with statewide parties. The 
SN was highly critical of the Partito Sardo’s coalitions with the DC and then the PSI/PCI. At 
the same time, the SN’s declaration of belonging to no ideological group should be 
understood as a rejection of left-right party politics in Italy rather than the lack of a set of 
social principles. For the SN does have an ideological position; by analysing its party 
literature we can see that it is clearly situated on the left of the political spectrum (SN 1996, 
1999, 2000). This is evident in the party’s references to its socialist libertarian predecessor, its 
language of anticolonialism, its objection to the globalisation of markets, its advocacy of 
international solidarity, its belief in the welfare state, and its condemnation of neoliberalism. 
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The SN’s strategy may be understood as a refusal to play the Italian political game – which it 
sees as being characterised by left-right party competition. In fact, the SN argues that 
ideological polarisation is simply a political instrument used by Italian political elites to split 
the Sardinian nation into two ideological camps as part of a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy.  
Though certainly not conquered, the Sardinian nationalist movement was further 
divided with the birth of the PSIN/SN. This was essentially a division between federalisti and 
independentisti. But in 2001, the situation became more complicated after a wing of the SN 
broke away to form another party, Indipendentzia Reppubrica Sardignia (IRS). The breakway 
of IRS from Sardignia Natzione was caused by the latter’s search for a coalition partner in the 
form of the federalist Psd’Az. IRS leader Gavino Sale and his colleagues refused to 
participate in any form of dialogue with the Psd’Az, which it perceived as just another 
‘unionist’ party in Sardinia which, through its coalition with statewide parties, had sold out 
the island’s autonomy. Aside from this, there are few differences in the programmes of the 
IRS and SN. Like the SN, the IRS supports full independence of Sardinia and uses the 
language of anti-colonialism and anti-globalisation to support its argument for creating an 
independent Sardinian republic. Both parties also wish to protect Sardinia’s language, culture 
and heritage, to safeguard Sardinia’s traditional agro-pastoral economy and to protect the 
environment, thereby fusing nationalism with ecological concerns to create a type of 
‘econationalism’ (IRS, 2004).  
Yet although the IRS has much in common with the SN, it is also suspicious of the 
latter’s motives, especially where its coalition interests are concerned. The SN’s enthusiasm 
for an alliance with the Psd’Az in 2001 (as discussed below) was vigorously opposed by the 
IRS, which perceives the Psd’Az as an ‘establishment’ party that is intent on keeping Sardinia 
within the Italian state. The IRS argues that the ‘autonomy’ endorsed by its national 
competitors has resulted in economic deprivation, the destruction of Sardinia’s forests and 
agricultural economy, the pillaging of its mineral resources, cultural stigmatisation and the 
‘shame’ of being Sardinian, the prevention of the flourishing of the Sardinian language and 
the political alienation of the Sardinian people from the regional clientelist class (IRS, 2005). 
These types of accusations have so far won little electoral support. In the 2005 administrative 
elections the party won 1.7% of the vote (though this figure reached 3.7% in the province of 
Sassari, which was sufficient to elect leader Gavino Sale as a councillor) and in the 2006 
national elections it won only 1.1% of the vote in Sardinia. The IRS thus remains a very 
minor force in Sardinian politics, and has no formal links with the SN or Psd’Az. 
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During this period, the Psd’Az itself moved further to the left of the political spectrum. 
A precedent had already been set in the 1980s when the Psd’Az joined alliance with the PSI 
and PCI in the regional government, but a growing centre-left orientation has been more 
evident in its recent policies. For instance, during the debates over devolution proposals in 
2005, Psd’Az spokesperson Antonio Moro called Bossi’s version of devolution a federalismo 
egoistico. He asserted that the Psd’Az sought to create a solidaristic federalism based on 
cooperation between regions. The party also argued that the proposals for fiscal federalism 
were ‘too vague and indefinite’ (Psd’Az, 2006). The Psd’Az believed that Bossi’s plans 
would benefit the northern regions to the detriment of the poor through its reform of the fiscal 
equalisation programme. This placed the party clearly within the ambit of the centre-left’s 
position on decentralisation versus devolution.  
 
Nationalism and the Statewide Parties 
The strong territorial dimension of politics in Sardinia has meant that ‘autonomy’, and less 
class and religion, is the ‘central axis’ upon which Sardinian parties compete (Tidore, 1992: 
29). According to Paolo Pisu, regional councillor for the Rifondazione Comunista, ‘in 
Sardinia we’re all federalists, autonomists or separatists’.5 In Sardinia, the regional branches 
of statewide parties have been expert at playing the Sardinian card and have pressed for 
further regional rights. Support for a ‘real’ autonomy has gained momentum across parties, 
and a declaration of the sovereignty of Sardinia was approved by a majority of members of 
the Regional Council in 1999. This has not always been the case. At earlier times, the 
positions of many Sard parties were unfavourable to autonomy, seeing any form of 
particularism as backward. Statewide parties moved back and forth on the territorial 
dimension throughout the postwar period, which is our next subject of discussion.  
The Christian Democrats (DC) constituted the party of government in Sardinia from 
1948 to 1991 (with a short break in the 1980s when a nationalist-left coalition came to power 
– see Table 2). This meant that, within the Sardinian autonomous institutions that they 
presided over, the DC Sarda was also the party of autonomy. During the drafting of the Italian 
Constitution in 1946-48, the DC Sarda enthusiastically supported the creation of autonomous 
institutions for Sardinia. This was in keeping with the state party’s stance, which favoured a 
decentralised Italian state in line with its commitment to ‘local participation’ and the Catholic 
notion of subsidiarity (Partridge 1998: 54).6 Thus, the Sardinian DC’s regionalist orientation 
did not create a problem for the statewide party, and nor did its long-term governing alliance 
with the Psd’Az. At times, it seemed that the DC had stolen the Partito Sardo’s clothes, in 
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their desire to increase the powers of the region.7 However, there was a clear difference in the 
constitutional demands of the two parties: whilst the Psd’Az called for the creation of a 
federal Italy in which Sardinia could exert its own authority, the DC believed that whatever 
Sardinia’s devolved powers, it should remain firmly in the ambit of Italian state politics 
(Clark 1989: 423). However, this position was questioned in the aftermath of the failed 
economic ‘plans of rebirth’. After years of having been complicit with the Italian 
government’s questionable economic experiments in Sardinia, the Young Turks in the DC 
Sarda embarked on a politica contestativa: ‘a politics of open confrontation with Rome and 
the same political class in Sardinia which, with a considerable influence in all of the parties 
and a presence in the national parliament […] was accused of not doing enough possible for 
the interests of the island and, on the contrary, of favouring government projects and 
programmes that undermined the autonomy and self-determination of the Sards’ (Brigaglia et 
al, 2002: 76). However, these efforts were considered to be too little and too late (Clark, 1996: 
90) and the autonomist movement became associated with the Left.  
 
 
Table 2: Regional Electoral Performance of Sardinian Parties, 1949-89 (% of votes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Regional Council of Sardinia and Istituto Cattaneo 
 
 
The Left in Sardinia has not always been supportive of demands for autonomy. During 
the 1940s, both the Socialist Party (PSI) and Communist Party (PCI) were stolidly against 
giving autonomy to the regions, as this was perceived as being detrimental to the goals of 
creating a centralised, unitary state. As Cento Bull (1997: 2) points out, the Communists and 
Socialists ‘were suspicious of any form of federalism in case it promoted reactionary political 
tendencies at the periphery’. However, in the Sardinian branch of the PCI there also existed a 
 1949 1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 
Psd’Az 17.0 7.0 6.0 7.2 6.3 4.5 3.1 3.3 13.8 12.9 
DC 33.0 41.1 43.0 46.3 43.4 44.5 38.3 37.7 32.1 35.0 
PCI 19.4 22.3 17.5 20.5 20.5 19.7 26.8 26.3 28.7 23.1 
PSI/PSDI 8.9 10.6 12.2 12.8 16.1 16.3 17.3 15.8 14.4 18.6 
MSI/PNM 18.5 16.3 11.6 11.0 7.5 6.7 7.8 5.3 3.9 3.5 
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‘tepid autonomist position’ (Sotgiu, 1996: 31) that acknowledged the specificity of Sardinian 
identity, history and traditions. For some party members, the party did not go far enough in 
recognising the unique identity of Sardinia and in 1944 Antonio Cassita broke away and 
established the Partito Comunista Sardo. The PCS sought to create ‘a Federal Socialist 
Republic in which Sardinia will be inserted as an Autonomous Sardinian Republic’ (cited in 
Mattone, 1982: 29). Its position helped force the hand of the PCI, which moved towards 
supporting a more ‘moderate regionalism’ (Melis, 1982: 34), but the ambiguity in its 
territorial goals remained. Its main challenge was to integrate those Sards who were 
sympathetic to the ideals of Communism but who also wanted to give autonomy a class-based 
interpretation. But it could not make ‘autonomism’ synonymous with communism, as many 
right-wing Sard supported autonomy and, moreover, demands for special recognition were 
antithetical to the Marxist interpretation of class struggle. For this reason, the PCI had to 
officially oppose ‘particularism’, and any measures that could unite Sardinians against the 
Italian state.  
In the immediate post-war period, the Socialist Party seemed equally hostile to 
Sardinian autonomy. The Cagliari branch of the PSI was convinced that socialism would 
answer the problems of ethnic difference by levelling them (Pintore 1996: 9), which would 
thwart the domino effect of regional demands leading to independence, and prevent the 
demise of Italy. Yet the party was soon forced to reconsider this position when Lussu’s 
breakaway party, the Socialist Sardinian Party of Action, joined the Italian Socialists in 1949. 
It sought to change the PSI’s views on the regional question, and to some extent succeeded: 
‘the entrance of the socialist sardisti accelerated the process, already begun, of the conversion 
of the party to the idea of autonomy’ (Contu, 1992: 29). Furthermore, following the rise of the 
neo-sardism movement in the 1960s and 1970s, the PCI and PSI in Sardinia were both forced 
to re-evaluate their positions on the regional question (Ortu, 1998: 87). This was in part 
motivated by a concern that their resistance to reforms safeguarding the Sard language and 
teaching of Sard history would lose them electoral support. It was also motivated by statewide 
factors: in the 1970s, regional governments had been established elsewhere in Italy. This was 
an initiative of the PSI/DC/PCI government that carried through the reforms promised in the 
1948 Constitution, resulting in Italy becoming a ‘regional state’ (Clark, 1984: chap. 18).  
The PCI became the main beneficiary of increased representation in decentralised 
institutions in the central belt, making it more open-minded to claims for autonomy. But this 
was ‘autonomy’ of a particular kind: for instance, the PCI opposed the creation of zona franca 
and insisted that the regional authorities must be empowered to draw up and execute a new set 
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of economic development programmes so that Sardinia could ‘catch up’ with the rest of Italy 
(Ortu, 1998: 80; Accardo, 1998: 130). The PSI took a similar stance, arguing for a more 
effective exercise of current regional powers, rather than more powers (Accardo, 1998: 133). 
The Left maintained that the previous plans of rebirth had failed because of the DC regional 
elite’s misuse of authority and argued that they would better use the resources available to 
increase the welfare of the Sardinian people (Ballero, 1985). They got their chance when a 
coalition of the Psd’Az, PCI and PSI was elected to government in 1981-2 and 1984-89. But 
even the Left was unable to overturn Sardinia’s ailing economy or to break its dependence on 
the state, and the failure of the government’s reforms incited voters to call the DC back into 
government in 1989. The political climate of frustration with the local political classes, their 
patronage, clientelistic networks, lack of vision and failure to improve the welfare of the Sard 
people, would soon hit crisis point, though for extra-Sardinian reasons.  
 
Electoral System Change 
In the early 1990s, the Italian political system underwent a meltdown. A group of judges in 
Milan uncovered widespread corruption amongst the highest-ranking members of government 
in the DC and Socialist Parties, a phenomenon since called Tangentopoli (‘bribesville’). The 
Christian Democrats and Socialist Party were dissolved, which was followed by the break up 
of the Communist Party after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The PCI was succeeded by handful 
of smaller parties divided along complex ideological lines. Following the collapse of the old 
political system, a mixed majoritarian-PR electoral system was introduced in 1993, designed 
to reduce fragmentation. The result was a less fractionalised and bi-polar party system, based 
around competition between a centre-left coalition and a centre-right one (see Table 3). This 
has put Sardinian nationalist and regionalist parties in a precarious situation: unless they join 
one of the two ideological alliances dominating Italian politics – Romani Prodi’s centre-left 
Olive/Union coalition (becoming the ‘Democratic Party’ in 2007) or Silvio Berlusconi’s 
centre-right House/Pole of Liberty (becoming the ‘People of Freedom’ party in 2009) – they 
are squeezed out of the elections (see Table 3 for electoral results 1994-2009). However, the 
response of Sardinia’s nationalist and regionalist parties to the creation of bipolar politics in 
Italy has differed greatly. Whilst the Psd’Az has continued its tradition of seeking 
accommodation within the left or right Italian party families (by joining Prodi’s Olive 
coalition in 1996, and Berlusconi’s People of Liberty party in an electoral alliance in 2009), 
the smaller parties have refused to offer any support to parties that appear to be directly or 
indirectly controlled from Rome. 
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Table 3: Regional Electoral Performance of Sardinian Parties, 1994-2009 (% of votes) 
 1994 1999 2004 2009 
Centre-Right* 32.2 29.6 22.3 30.2 
Centre-Left** 18.1 14.2 31.8 24.8 
Psd’Az 5.1 4.5 3.8 4.3 
Other Regionalists*** 3.4 1.77 1.13 4.9 
Source: Istituto Cattaneo and Roux (2006) 
*Centre-right: Forza Italia/Msi-Dn/AN/People of Freedom 
**Centre-left: Pds/DS/Margherita/Progetto Sardegna/Democratic Party 
***Other regionalists: Sardignia Natzione/ Lega Nord/Lega Sarda/ IRS/Movement for Autonomy 
 
 
Being small ‘non-ideological’ parties, the Psd’Az and SN were damaged by the reform 
of the electoral law in 1993. On the eve of the decision to create a majoritarian political 
system in Italy, following the report of the Bicameral Commission charged with electoral 
reform, members of Sardigna Natzione travelled to Rome to demonstrate against what they 
perceived to be a deliberate attempt to destroy the smaller parties in Italy. As their demands 
went unheard, the SN was forced to develop an alternative strategy to deal with the 
restrictions that the new system imposed on them: the creation of a ‘nationalist pole’ in 
Sardinian party politics that countered the centre-left and centre-right alliances. The SN was 
committed to a ‘principle of non-collaboration’ with any local or national political party that 
was under Italian control. Instead, its main collaborators were local civic groups and 
nationalist and regionalist parties elsewhere in Europe, particularly in Corsica. Yet the 
introduction of the majoritarian political system in Italy forced the SN to look for new 
electoral partners. At first, the party eschewed any partnership with the Psd’Az, the most 
obvious candidate, due to the latter’s tendency to ally itself to statewide parties. In the 1999 
regional elections, the SN formed a coalition with the tiny Sardinian Pastoral Movement and 
the Sardinian Nationalist Movement which was called Mesa de sos sardos liberos. The 
coalition gained 1.9% in the provincial election of 1999. This poor result caused the party to 
wonder whether it should form a broader ‘nationalist bloc’ with the Psd’Az, which would 
have gained the list 10% in the provincial list. The SN believed that the nationalist project 
would be strengthened if the parties demanding national self-determination came together to 
form a strategic alliance.  
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As a result, Sardinia’s principal nationalist and regionalist parties attempted a strategy 
of ‘depolarisation’ – that is, their self-exclusion from a particular ideological stance, and their 
creation of a third ‘autonomist pole’ in Sardinian politics to compete with the Italian centre-
left and centre-right coalitions. The Psd’Az and SN entered a ‘strategic relationship’ in 2001 
by forming a coalition called ‘Independentzia’ to contest the regional elections. This was the 
first nationalist alliance of its kind in Sardinia. In the ‘Indipendenzia’ list, the parties 
compromised on a number of issues, though they found common ground on others. The 
parties rejected what it perceived to be the ‘false federalism’ being pushed by the Lega Nord. 
Instead they endorsed the idea of creating a Europe of the Peoples, but agreed that this should 
be only as a stepping stone to the independence of Sardinia within a European federal or 
confederal construct (Indipendentzia, 2001). They also reinforced their commitment to 
working within the Conference of Nations without States and the European Free Alliance 
(EFA) to lobby the draft European constitution to include recognition of ‘the right to 
independence by stateless nations’ (Indipendenzia, 2001: 1). On policy matters, the 
Independentzia programme called for fiscal autonomy, territorial control and recognition of 
the Sard language. In the run-up to the election, Giacomo Sanno, Secretary of the Psd’Az said 
that ‘The Independence list represents the real novelty in the elections. It is an historic 
moment that has united two spirits, one that is young and another that is old, that have found 
unity. Through coming together, they channel the desire of the nationalist force to bring the 
nation to independence. The way it has developed so far, autonomy no longer makes any 
sense’ (L’Unione Sarda, 22 April 2001). However, the decision of the Psd’Az and SN party 
leaders to join forces was not as enthusiastically welcomed by the Sardinian electorate: whilst 
in 1996, the parties, taken separately, had obtained 6.1% of the Sardinian vote in Italian 
statewide elections, in the 2001 statewide elections, the Independentizia list won only 3.4% of 
the vote (whilst during the 1999 regional elections, the Psd’Az – standing alone – was able to 
take a more significant 4.5% of the vote).  
Soon thereafter, the parties decided to break their alliance and hopes for the creation of 
a ‘nationalist pole’ dwindled. The socialist wing of SN broke away to form a new party – the 
IRS – due to the failed collaboration with what it considered to be the ‘traitorous’ Psd’Az. 
Since then, the IRS has flatly refused to engage in any type of alliance with the other 
nationalist or statewide parties, as this might compromise its radical goals for the creation of 
an independent republic of Sardinia. Meanwhile, Antonio Delitalia, Vice-Secretary of the 
Psd’Az, admitted that it had been ‘an error not joining the Olive coalition’ (La Nuova 
Sardegna, 17 May 2001). Following the disastrous result, the Psd’Az did indeed join the 
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Union alliance, and later, an electoral list with the Sardinian Project. However, this left-
nationalist alliance was not to last, and in the 2009 regional elections the Psd’Az abandoned 
any leftist pretence by entering a pre-electoral alliance and then a coalition government at the 
regional level, with the right-wing Forza Italia Sarda and Alleanza Nazionale (L’Unione 
Sarda, 9 January 2009). This caused serious reverberations throughout the party, with one 
group of leftist members forming a splinter group Rosso mori. Ideological incoherence has 
always been the ‘achilles heel’ of the Psd’Az (Hepburn, 2009). 
 
A Centre Left—Nationalist Fusion? The Birth of the Sardinian Project 
The advent of a broad centre-left autonomist alliance in 2002, headed by the media 
communications baron Renato Soru, marked an important change in Sardinian territorial 
politics. The Sardinia Project (Il Progetto Sardegna) began its life not as a ‘party’ but as a 
coalition, including representatives from outside politics – predominantly from academia, 
industry and civil society – as well as centre-left parties. Its party members included Sinistra 
Federalista Sarda (DS), La Margherita, Udeur, Italia dei Valori, Socialisti Democratici 
Italiani, Partito Comunista Rifondazione (RC), Comunisti Italiani (PCI) and i Verdi (Greens). 
Whilst the Psd’Az was not an official member of the coalition, it stood as part of the PS list in 
the regional elections in 2004. That year, the PS entered office in Cagliari, becoming at first a 
parliamentary group, and then transforming itself into a political party called the Partito 
Democratic Sardo (Sardinian Democratic Party) in 2007. The creation of the PS was a result 
of both statewide and regional factors. At the statewide level, the creation of a more bilpolar 
electoral system forced parties on the left and right to form alliances – and in Sardinia this 
took a particularly regionalist guise, as one of the main goals of the Project was to secure 
greater autonomy for Sardinia. The Project also followed the Italian trend of giving a strong 
leadership role to someone who was not a professional politician. Renato Soru, the media 
communications baron and multi-millionare, in many ways had much in common with Forza 
Italia’s Silvio Berlusconi, though they came from different sides of the political spectrum. 
There were also regional factors at play too. The success of the Sardinia Project may largely 
be interpreted as a reaction to the old regional political class, which, in the eyes of many 
Sardinians, has permeated the corruption of the pre-Tangentopoli era through clientelism and 
patronage, and has deliberately maintained the stagnation of the Sardinian economy in order 
to protect personal business interests.  
 As a solution, the Project called for an end to the old political class in Sardinia, the 
‘valorisation’ of the Sardinian nation, and the strengthening of its identity, language and 
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culture as a means of building self-confidence (Sardegna Insieme, 2004: 1). Its initial 
programme sought to link ‘innovation with the preservation of the environment and identity, 
claiming an ethnic revival of regional politics and increasingly restive with national decisions 
over the regional territory’ (Casula, 2005: 15). The PS also sought to construct a sense of 
nationhood that was integrated into its socioeconomic programme. The Project’s plans 
included ‘saving the coasts’ (Salvacosta) to increase the potential of tourism, to ‘export not 
emigrate’, to protect the environment, cut down on regional government bureaucracy, and 
underlying all of this, to bolster the Sardinian identity through plans for bilingualism and 
other cultural initiatives that ‘stimulate communications with the outside world’ (PS, 2005). 
These proposals won the support of a large section of the population, as well as the approval 
of other nationalist and regionalist parties such as Sardignia Natzione, which had long battled 
to protect the island’s language. 
Indeed, when the Sardinian Project was in office from 2004-9, there was something of 
a revival of cultural nationalism in Sardinia. This was largely related to the passing of a 
regional law that makes the Sardinian language official, called ‘sa limba sarda comune’ (a 
communal Sardinian language) in 2006. In justifying the law, President Soru argued that ‘we 
are the largest linguistic minority in Italy, however we are the only one that has still not 
decided to make its language official’ (Il Manifesto, 26 April 2006). The recognition of 
Sardinia’s most powerful cultural characteristic – its language – encouraged a renaissance in 
traditional Sardinian dancing, singing and cultural festivals. The renewed pride in Sardità (the 
Sard identity) indicates that the neo-sardismo movement of the 1960s, though greatly 
absorbed over the years, never entirely disappeared. This has forced regional branches of 
statewide parties to alter their position on nationality-related issues accordingly.  
After joining Soru’s centre-left coalition in 2002, there were noticeable changes within 
the Sardinian branches of statewide parties. The Democrats of the Left (DS) more openly 
favoured the creation of a cooperative federal state in Italy whilst the Sardinian Refounded 
Communist Party (RC) became an enthusiastic supporter of increased autonomy for the 
island. On the other side of Italy’s political divide, within the Pole of Liberty (renamed House 
of Liberty in 1996), both Forza Italia Sarda and Alleanza Nazionale proclaimed to be pro-
federalist parties and acknowledged the specificity of Sardinian language, culture and 
identity. Forza Italia Sarda, which came to power as part of a new centre-right ‘People of 
Freedom’ party (Popolo della Libertà) in coalition with the Psd’Az in the Sardinian regional 
elections of February 2009 (see Table 3), even perceives Sardinia to constitute a cultural 
nation. The party has argued that Sardinia’s distinct cultural identity should be recognised in 
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the re-writing of the Sardinian Special Statute, in which they want: ‘a restatement of the 
instruments that strengthen the Sardinian culture, which is an ancient culture, with some 
particularities in particular in its language, and that could be used as a resource, not only on 
the social level but also on the economic level’.8 Clearly, both of the major statewide 
alliances-turned-parties have moved to the centre ground on the territorial question: endorsing 
federalism, increased powers for the regions, and the acknowledgement of regional identities.  
Due the territorialisation of the statewide parties, and their adoption of a more 
explicitly ‘regionalist’ mantle, the Psd’Az was rendered politically insignificant. The party’s 
‘unique selling point’ – the demand for self-determination – was no longer unique: it has 
come to be endorsed by every single other party in Sardinia (though autonomist demands 
range from devolution to federalism or independence). The Psd’Az no longer ‘owned’ the 
issue of territory in party competition, and was forced to compete on this dimension with 
regional branches of the Italian statewide parties (as well as several other nationalist parties). 
This is comparable to the fate of the regionalist parties in Belgium, whose worth was spent 
following the regionalisation of the mainstream parties (Deschouwer, 2009).  
 
The challenges of multilevel politics  
As we have seen, statewide parties have adapted to multi-level politics by developing 
programmes and policies that acknowledge Sardina’s claim to nationhood. This has enabled 
statewide parties to compete with the nationalists on the territorial dimension. For some 
parties, such as the Democrats of the Left (DS), this has entailed the adoption of a federal 
constitution in 2005 and the decentralisation of organisational functions to regional branches, 
such as internal decision-making, candidate selection, and control over campaigns and policy 
(Detterbeck and Hepburn, 2009). In Sardinia, the DS joined the Sardinia Project in 2002, 
which became the Sardinian Democratic Party in 2007. More centralised party organisations, 
such as the Allenza Nazionale and Forza Italia, have also devolved a degree of policy 
autonomy to the Sardinian branches. This indicates that Sardinian branches of Italian parties 
have adapted their internal organisations and policy goals to multi-level politics. Statewide 
parties are no longer able to pursue a common political objective across the entire territory of 
Italy – instead, they have differentiated their strategies to the regional context. 
 But how have Sardinian nationalist and regionalist parties reacted to the development 
of multi-level politics, the creation of different playing fields, and the adaptation of statewide 
party strategies to new territorial configurations? Historically, the Psd’Az has concentrated on 
both the Sardinian and Italian political levels as part of its vision of creating a federal Italy. 
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Hence the Partito Sardo engaged in coalitions with the Christian Democrats and the Left 
during the postwar period as part of a strategy of trying to influence these parties to adopt 
more pro-autonomy positions on the Italian and Sardinian levels. The Psd’Az also dabbled in 
alliances with other nationalist and regionalist parties at the Italian level. Despite twenty years 
of consistently allying itself to centre-left parties and alliances, in 2006 the Psd’Az generated 
surprise by entering a coalition with the populist right-wing Lega Nord and the Sicilian-based 
Movimento per l’Autonomia in the 2006 national elections, called the ‘Pact for the 
Autonomies’ (Patto per le autonomie). This strategy was in part motivated by the failure of 
the Psd’Az to successfully align itself with Sardignia Natzione in 2001, and its refusal to 
become part of Renato Soru’s Sardinian Democratic Party in 2007. Instead, the Psd’Az had 
hoped to elect a member to the Senate by creating an Italian ‘autonomist pole’ that 
transcended ideological divisions. This plan backfired and the party’s electoral support 
dwindled, forcing the party to go back to the drawing board to figure out how to survive 
bipolar politics. As mentioned above, this resulted in a pre-electoral deal with the right-wing 
Forza Italia Sarda in 2009. 
 Aside from this failed endeavour at the statewide level, the Psd’Az since the early 
1980s has been firmly committed to engagement at the European level. As we saw earlier, the 
party was successful in electing Mario Melis to the European Parliament in the 1980s, it was a 
founding member of the European Free Alliance, and the Psd’Az also established a number of 
formal and informal linkages with other nationalist and regionalist parties in Europe. 
However, the Psd’Az has also encountered some problems in playing the multi-level game. 
For instance, in the early 1990s the Psd’Az had again sought to create links with the Lega 
Nord in an attempt to create a nationalist opposition to Roman centralism and ‘partitocrazia’ 
(Accardo 1998: 134). In 1993, representatives of the two parties met to discuss tactics. 
However, this alliance did not last long, in part because the LN had developed such a 
Eurosceptical and xenophobic position that it was banned from the European Free Alliance in 
1994 – an organisation that the Psd’Az held in high regard. Yet although the Psd’Az was 
careful to distance itself from the fiasco, and from the Lega itself, in order to protect its civic 
nationalist reputation in Europe, the Psd’Az in fact renewed its links with Bossi in a statewide 
electoral alliance in 2006, which cast into doubt its pro-European credentials and undermined 
it platform as a socially progressive party. Furthermore, by boycotting the European elections 
in 2009 in order to raise awareness of the serious issue of Sardinia’s lack of direct 
representation in the European parliament, the Psd’Az has also risked being seen as an anti-
European party. 
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The other nationalist and regionalist parties have also made efforts to adapt to multi-
level politics by including a European dimension in their constitutional goals, though they 
continue to denounce any involvement in Italian politics. The SN and IRS have viewed 
Sardinia’s participation in an integrating Europe as a way of lessening, if not outright 
severing, the island’s relations with (and dependence on) the Italian state. Sardignia Natzione 
is active at the European level, although it prefers working outside the ‘official’ institutions of 
the EU. For instance, the SN has developed bilateral contacts with other nationalist and 
regionalist parties in the Mediterranean, in particular with Corsica Natzione. However, the SN 
has also experienced problems in playing the multi-level game. The SN has been involved in 
an alliance with the Basque party Herri Batasuna – a radical Europhobic party with a terrorist 
wing fighting for the national independence of the Basque Country. Herri Batasuna agreed to 
‘represent’ the SN in the European Parliament in 1999-2004 when Sardinia did not have a 
representative. This relationship indicates a certain naivety on the part of the SN, which does 
not endorse violence in its struggle for self-determination, and which sees the EU as an 
imperfectly formed but potentially beneficial structure for Sardinian territorial claims. 
Meanwhile, the newest nationalist party, Indipendentzia Repubrica de Sardigna, is also 
involved in European activities but works outside the ‘mainstream’ networks, such as 
organising demonstrations and meetings of the European Social Forum. Like the SN, it 
subscribes to the doctrine of independence in Europe and has made alliances with the Scottish 
Socialist Party, the Catalan ERC, Corsica Natzione and also Herri Batsuna.  
The development of multi-level governance has therefore created a number of 
challenges and opportunities for parties in Sardinia. Whilst the Italian statewide parties have 
all ‘levelled-down’ their strategies by strengthening the regional branch to enable them to 
compete with the nationalist parties and to endorse a stronger form of autonomy, the 
nationalist parties have ‘levelled-up’ their strategies by pursuing their constitutional goals in 
the European sphere. This has created some problems for the parties in trying to integrate 
their regionalist, state and European goals and rhetoric. For instance, the Psd’Az’ leftist pro-
European credentials did not sit well with a statewide alliance with the Europhobic right-wing 
populist Lega Nord. Also, the SN’s commitment to peaceful resistance to capitalism was 
contradicted by its European alliance with the pro-violence Herri Batasuna. There are also 
some strategic differences within the nationalist movement. Whilst the Psd’Az has pursued 
opportunities to have an impact at the Italian statewide level (through its strategic partnerships 
with statewide parties and other nationalist and regionalist parties in Italy), the SN and IRS 
eschew participation in Italian statewide politics altogether. As the smaller nationalist parties 
© Hepburn, E. (2009). ‘Explaining Failure: the Highs and Lows of Sardinian Nationalism’, Regional & Federal 
Studies 19(4/5), 595-618. 
 
 25 
both reject any alliances with Italian parties, Europe has provided a welcome arena in which 
to pursue a common cause with like-minded socialist-republican nationalist and regionalist 
parties.  
 
Conclusion 
This contribution has explored the rise and fall of Sardinian nationalism, and the failure of the 
Psd’Az to become a relevant political player at the regional, state or European levels. It has 
argued that understanding the failure of regional mobilization tells us a great deal about the 
structural factors, and strategic choices, that are required for success. In the case of Sardinia, 
several factors were identified that led to the decline of the Psd’Az. These included the party’s 
inability to firmly position itself on the left-right divide, its failure to compete with rival 
nationalist and regionalist parties and regional branches of statewide parties on the centre-
periphery dimension (which resulted in its territorial goals being adopted elsewhere), its 
highly erratic choice of coalition partners at the regional, state and European levels (whereby 
an association with the Lega Nord in particular undermined its pro-European and progressive 
credentials), and its inability to manoeuvre successfully in a bipolar party system. These 
strategic factors are rarely addressed as conditions for success in regionalist mobilisation in 
the literature, which has tended to focus on structural constraints and opportunities (see 
Müller-Rommel, 1998). As such, there is a great deal of scope for developing future research 
agendas based on these factors to determine the success or failure of regionalist mobilisation 
in a comparative context. For instance, these factors – ideological incoherence, intra-
nationalist competition, territorialisation of statewide parties, bipolar party politics and 
coalition-making in a multi-level system – could be used to generate testable hypotheses to be 
evaluated in other cases. 
Of particular note, this contribution has emphasized the importance of nationalist and 
regionalist party competition on the left/right ideological dimension as a determinant of 
success or failure. The Partito Sardo d’Azione, and later the SN and IRS, have pursued 
several strategies to prioritise territorial demands over the left-right dimension, but none of 
them have generated any lasting success. The first broad strategy resulted in the ‘ideological 
polarisation’ of the nationalist movement whereby the Psd’Az split into left-right ideological 
camps in 1923 and 1948. A second strategy saw the Partito Sardo’s ideological re-positioning 
from one polarity to another in line with its coalition partners – the Christian Democrats, then 
the Left, and currently the Right. A third strategy was adopted in response to bipolar politics, 
which represented ‘ideological de-polarisation’, or an attempt to prioritise the territorial 
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dimension over ideology as the primary cleavage of party competition. In competition with 
the centre-left and centre-right camps, the Psd’Az and SN excluded themselves from left-right 
party competition, instead seeking to create a ‘nationalist pole’ in Sardinia.  
However, this strategy failed due to a number of reasons. First, the nationalist parties 
were themselves divided (internally and between parties) on a number of key issues – such as 
constitutional aims, attitudes towards coalitions, and political methods. Second, the statewide 
parties had outmanoeuvred the nationalists by endorsing an autonomist position across the 
ideological spectrum. Third, in an era of bipolar politics, the Psd’Az’s ideological ‘wooliness’ 
became a drawback rather than an advantage in elections. The experience of the Psd’Az 
therefore largely confirms Freeden’s (1998) argument that nationalist parties have to 
complement their core business – territorial demands – with a clear position on the left-right 
dimension in order to compete successfully in political systems divided along left-right lines. 
The Psd’Az continues to call itself a broad church in which all nationalists are 
welcome. However, the ‘church’ has been stretched so far that it has, on more than one 
occasion, near collapsed. Furthermore, the party’s reluctance to develop a comprehensive 
socioeconomic programme ignores the fact that, in Sardinia, demands for autonomy have 
been constantly focused, not on greater constitutional rights, but rather on the need to develop 
the tools necessary to achieve social change and economic modernisation. By refusing to 
articulate a clear set of social values, Sardinian nationalists have excluded themselves from 
the ongoing dialogue on the future of Sardinia in Italy and Europe, and by this, have relegated 
themselves to playing only a minor role in Sardinian political life in the future. 
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1 Although there was strong regionalist feeling everywhere in Italy, other autonomist movements were not 
established until after the Second World War, in Valle d’Aosta, Piedmont, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Venetia and 
Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol). 
2 From 1718 until 1847, Sardinia had its own separate Kingdom, which was ruled by the House of Savoy. 
Although the island’s autonomy was compromised during the ‘political fusion’ between Sardinia and the 
mainland territories in 1847 (Mattone, 1982: 20), Sardinia played an instrumental role in creating the new Italian 
nation-state in 1861, providing a king to stand as a figurehead of a united Italy, Vittorio Emmanuele II. 
3 In addition to the four nationalist parties already discussed, there are also another two right-wing nationalist 
parties in Sardinia: Fortza Paris, which allies itself with the centre-right in elections, and Unione dei Sardi 
(UDS), headed by ex-President of Sardinia and Leader of the Sardinian DC, Mario Floris. However, these parties 
are too small, and have too insignificant an impact on Sardinian politics, to merit examination here. 
4 Interview with the author, Cagliari, 23 May 2005. 
5 Interview with the author, 20 May 2005. 
6 Although the Italian DC was later reluctant to give more powers to the Communist-controlled regional 
governments of the central Italian ‘red belt’ (Clark, 1984), in principle the party supported a type of 
administrative decentralisation. 
7 ‘Che Cosa non e la regione’, in Riscossa 28 August 1944, cited in Clark (1989: 423). 
8 Interview with Giorgio La Spisa, Vice-President of Forza Italia Sarda, 23 May 2005. 
